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PREFACE
THEsubject of our policy on the North-West frontier
of India is one of great importance, as affecting
the general welfare of our Eastern Empire, and is
specially inte~estings t the present time, when military operations on a cousiderable scale are b e b g
coilducted against a combination of the independent
tribes along the frontier.
I t must be understood that the present condition
of affairs is no mere sudden outbrealr on the part of
our turbulent neighbours. Its causes lie far deeper,
and are the consequences of events i n bygone years.
In the following pages I have attempted to give
a short historical summary of its varying phases, in
the hope that I may thus assist the public in some
degree to understand its general bewings, and to
form a correct opinion of the policy which should
be pursued in the future.

JOHN ADYE,
General.
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INDIAN PRONTIER POLICY
AN HISTORICAL SKETCH

CHAPTER I
EVENTS PRIOR TO, AND IWCLUDING, FIRST' AFGHAN WAR
OF 1839-41

Proposed Invasion of India by Napoleon I.-Mission of Burnes to
CabuI-Its Prtilure-Hostility of nussia and Pereia-First Afghan
War, 1839-41-Its Vicissihudes and Collapse.

INconsidering the important and somewhat intricate
subject of policy on the North-Western frontier of
our Indian Empire it will be desirable, in the first
place, to give a concise history of the events which
have guided our action, and which for many years
past have exercised a preclorninating influence in that
part of our Eastern dominion.
Speaking generally, it may, I think, be said that
the main features of our policy on the North-Western
frontier have been determined by tlie gradual advance of Russia southwards, and partly also by the
turbulent character of the people of Afghanistan,
and of the independent tribes who inhabit the great
B
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region of mountains which lie between Russia and
ourselves.
These two circumstances-the first having been
the most powerful-have led us into great wars and
frontier expeditions, which as a rule have been costly,
and in some cases unjust, and their consequences
have not tended to strengthen our position either on
the frontier or in India itself.
It will be well therefore to give an outline of the
Russian conquests in Central Asia to the north of
afghanistan, and also of our dealings with the rulers
of Cabul in bygone pears, and we shall then be better
able to judge of our present position, and to determine the principles which should guide our NorthWestern frontier policy.
One of the first threats of invasion of India early
in the century was planned at Tilsit, and is thus described by Kaye : ' Whilst the followers of Alexander
and Napoleon were abandoning themselves to convivial pleasures, those monarchs were spending quiet
evenings together discussillg their future plans, and
projecting joint schemes of conquest. It was then
that they meditated the invasion of Hindostan by a
confederate army uniting on the plains of Persia ; and
no secret was made of the intention of the two great
European potentates to commence in the following
spring a hostile demonstration-Contre les possessions
de la compagnie des'Indes.'
Hiatory of the W r in Afghanistan.
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TREATY WITH PERSIA

'3

The peril, however, was averted by a treaty at
Teheran in March 1809, in which the Shah of Persia
covenanted not to permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia towards India, or towards
the ports of that country. And so the visionary
danger passed away.
The old southern boundary of Russia in Central
Asia extended froin the north of the Caspian by
Orenburg and Orsk, across to the old Mongolian city
of Semipalatinsk, and xas guarded by a cordon of
forts and Cossack outposts. I t was about 2,000 miles
in length, and ' abutted on the great Kirghis Steppe,
and to a certain extent controlled the tribes pasturing
in the vicinity, but by no means established the hold
of Russia on that pathless, and for the most part
lifeless, waste.'
During all the earlier years of the century, while
we were establishing our power in India, constant
intrigues and wars occurred in Persia, Afghanistan,
and Central Asia ; and rumours were occasionally
heard of threat,s against ourselves, which formed the
subject of diplomatic treatment from time to time ;
but in reality the scene was so distant that our
interests were not seriously affected, and it was not
until 1836 that they began to exercise a powerful
influence as regards our policy on the North-Wesf
frontier.

' Quartedy Beview, Oot. 1865.
B 2
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In that year Lord Auckland was GovernorGeneral, and Captain Alexander Burnes was sent on
a commercial inission up the Indus, and through the
Kyber Pass, to Cabul, where he was received in a
friendly manner by the Ameer Dost Mahorned. It
must be borne in inind that neither Scinde nor the
Punjaub was then under our rule, so that our
frontiers were still far distant from Afghanistan. It
was supposed at the time that Russia was advancing
southward towards India in league with Persia, and
the mission of Rurnes was in reality political, its
object being to induce the Ameer to enter into s
friendly alliance.
Dost; Mahomed was quite willing to meet our
views, and offered to give up altogether any connection wit11 the two Powers named. It, however,
sooil became apparent; that our interests were b y
no means identical; his great object, as we found,
being to recover the Peshawur district, which
liad been taken a few years previously by Runjeet
Singh, while we, on the other hand, courted his
friendship chiefly in order that his country might
prove a barrier against the advance of Russia and
Persia.
These respective views were evidently divergent
and the issues doubtful ; when suddenly a Russian
Envoy (Vicovitch), also on a so-called commercial
mission, arrived at Cabul, offering the Ameer money

,
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and assistance against the Sikhs. This altered the
aspect of affairs. Burnes wrote to the GovernorOenerd that the Russians were evidently trying to
outbid us. Still some hope remained, until definite
instructions arrived from Lord Auckland declining
to mediate with or to act against Runjeet Singh, the
ruler of the Pl~njaub. The Ameer felt that we made
great demands on him but gave him nothing in
return. I t then became evident that the mission of
Burnes was a failure, and in April 1838 he returned
to India. It was our first direct effort to provide
against a distant and unsubstantial danger, ancl it
failed ; but unfortunately we did not take the lesson
to heart.
I n the mea~ztimethe Shah of Persia, instigated by
Russia, besieged Herat, but after months of fruitless
effort, and in consec-uence of our sending troops to
the Persian Gulf, the Shah at length withdrew his
army.
I t was not only the hostile efforts of the Shah on
Merat in 1838 which were a cause of anxiety to the
Plidian Government; but, as Kaye writes,l 'far out
in the distance beyond the mountains of the Hindoo
Koosli there was the shadow of a great Northern
army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweeping
across the wilds and deserts of Central Asia towards
the frontiers of Hindostan.' That great Northern
I
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army, as we know nonv, but did not know then, was
tile column of Perofski, which had left Orenburg for
the attempted coniluest of Klliva, but which subsequently perished froin hardships and pestilence in the
snowy wastes of the Barsuk Desert, north of the
Aral.
I n view of all the circumstances-of the supposed
designs of Russia and Persia, and of the hostility and
iilcessailt intrigues in Afghanistan-the Government
of India were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst
the authorities widely differed as to the policy to be
pursued. Lord Auckland, however, at length decided
9n the assemblage of a British force for service
across the Indus. I n his manifesto issued in
December 1838 he first alluded to the Burnes
mission, and tlie causes of its failure. He then
referred to the claiins of Shah Soojah, a former ruler
of Afghanistan (who hacl been living for some years
in exile within our territories) and said we liad
determined, in co-operation with the Sikhs, to restore
him to power as Ameer of Cabul.
I t was arranged that Shah Soojah should enter
Afghanistan with his own troops, such as they were,
supported by a British army marching through
Scincle and Beloochistan. The Governor-General
expressed a hope that tranquillity would tllus be
established on the frontier, and a barrier formed
against external aggression; and he ended by pro-
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claiming that when the object was accomplished the
British army would be withdrawn.
This was indeed a momentous decision. The
Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Fane, had
already given an adverse opinion, saying that ' every
advance you make beyond the Sutlej in my opinion
adds to your military weakness.'
On the decision becoming known in England
many high authorities, and the public generally,
disapproved of the expedition." The Duke of Wellington said that ' our difficulties would commence
where our military successes ended,' and that 'the
consequences of crossing the Indus once, to settle a
Government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial
march into that country.' The Marquis Wellesley
spoke of ' the folly of occupying a land of rocks,
sands, deser8, and snow.' Sir Charles Metcalfe from
the k s t protested, and said, 'Depend upon it, the
surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves is
for us to cross the Indus and meddle with the countries beyond it.' Mr. Elphinstone wrote : ' If you
send 27,000 men up the Bolam to Candahar, and
can feed them, I have no doubt you can take
Candahar and Cabuk and set up Soojah, but as for
maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote
country, among a turbulent people like the Afghans,
1 own it seems to me to be hopeless. If you succeed
you will I fear weaken the position against Russia.
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The Afghans are neutral, and W O U Ihave
~ received
your aid against invaders with gratitude. They
\oil1 now be disaffected, and glad to join any invader
t o drive you out.'
Mr. Tucker, of the Court of Directors, wrote t o
tlle Duke of Wellington : 'We have contracted an
h does not
alliance with Shah Soojah, a l t l ~ o u ~he
possess a rood of ground in Afghanistan, nor a rupee
which he did not derive from our bounty as a
quondam pensioner.' 'He added, that 'even if we
succeed we must maintain him in the government
by a large military force, 800 miles from our frontier
and our resources.'
Tlie above were strong and weighty opinions and
arguments against the rash and distant enterprise on
which the Government of India were about to embark.
But there is more to be said. Independently of
the result in Afghanistan itself, it must be borne in
mind that the proposed line of march of the army
necessarily lecl through Scinde and Beloochistan,
countries which (whatever their former position may
have been) were then independent both of the Ameer
and of ourselves.
The force from Bengal, consisting of about 9,500
men of all arms, with 38,000 camp foUowers, accompanied by Shah Soojah's levy, left Ferozepore in
December, and crossing the Indus, arrived at Dadur,
the entrance to the Bolam Pass, in March 1839%

Dificultiea with the Ameers of Scinde at once arose,
chiefly as to our passage through their territories ;
but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they
were informed that 'the day they connected themselves with any other Power than England would
be the last of their independence, if not of their
rule.'
The army then advanced through the Bolam, ancl
reached Quetta on March 26th. But here again
obstacles similar in character' to those just described
occurred, and Sir Alexander Burnes visited the ruler
of Beloochistan (the Khan of Khelat), demanding
assistance, especially as to supplies of food. The
Prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out that though
we might restore Shah Soojah, we would not carry
the Afghans with us, and would fail in the end. He
alluded to the devastation which our march had
already caused in the country; but having been
granted a subsidy, unwillingly consented to afford us
assistance ; and the army, leaving possible enemies in
its rear, passed on, and reached Candahar without
opposition in April. A t the end of June it recommenced its march northwards, and Ghuznee having
been stormed and captured, our troops without
further fighting arrived at Cabul on April 6. Dost
Maliomed, deserted for the time by his people, fled
northward over the Hindoo Koosh, finding a temporary
Kaye'8 W w in Afghanistan.
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refuge in Bokhara, and Shah Soojah reigned in his
steatt.
80 far the great expedition had apparently
accomplished its object, and the success of the
tripartite treaty between ourselves, the h'ikhs, and
the new Ameer had been successfully carried out,
almost entirely, however, by ourselves as the predominant partner.
The time therefore would seem to have arrived
when, in fulfilment of Lord Auckland's proclamation,
the British army should be withdrawn from
Afghanistan. For the moment this appeared to be
the case. But in reality it was not so, and our
position soon became dangerous, then critical, and at
last desperate. In the first place, the long line of
communicstion was liable st any time to be
interrupted, as already mentioned; then, again, the
arrival of Shah Soojah had excited no enthusiasm ;
and the very fact that we were foreigners in language,
religion and race, rendered our presence hateful to
his subjects. I n short, the new Ameer was, and
continued to be, a mere puppet, supported in
authority by British bayonets.
These conditions were apparent from the first
day of his arrival, and grew in intensity until the
end. Shah Soojah himself soon discovered that his
authority over his people was almost nominal ; and
although he chafed at our continued presence in the'

1839

WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

II

counbry, he also felt that the day of our departure
would be the last of his reign, and that our withdrawal was under the circumstances impossible.
But the situation was equally complicated from our
own point of view. If, as originally promised, the
British troops were withdrawn, the failure of the
expedition would at once become apparent by the
anarchy which would ensue. On the other hand, to
retain an army in the far-distant mountains of
Afghanistan would not only be a breach of faith,
but, while entailing enormous expense, would deprive
India of soldiers who might be required elsewhere.
After lengthy consideration, it was decided to
reduce the total of our force in the country, while
retaining a hold for the present on Cabul, Ghuznee,
and Candahar, together with the passes of the Kylser
and Bolam. In short, the British army was weakly
scattered about i11 a region of mountains, amongst a
hostile people, and with its long lines of communication insufficiently guarded. Both in a military and
a political point of view the position was a false and
dangerous one.
General Sir John Keane, who was about to return
to India, writing at the time, said Mark my words,
it will not be long before there is here some signal
catastrophe.' During the summer of 1840 there
were troubles both in the Kyber and Bolam passes.
I n the former the tribes, incensed at not receiving

12
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sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts and
plundered our stores ; while in Beloochistan matters
were so serious that a British force was sent, and
captured Kllelat, the Khan being killed, and part of
his territory handed over to Shah 8oojah.l Rumours
from Central Asia also added to our anxieties.
Although the failure of the Russian attempt on
Khiva became known some months later, it excited
apprehension at the time amongst our political
officers in Cabul. Sir Alexander Rurnes, during the
winter of 1839, expressed opinions m-l~ich were
curiously inconsistentwith each other. ' I maintain,'
he said, 'that man to be an enemy to his country
who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of
the Indus ;' while at the same moment he advocated
the advance of our troops over the Bindoo Koosh
into Balkh, so as to be ready to meet the Russians in
the following May.
Sir William McNaghten, the chief political officer
in Cabul, went still further, and in April 1840 not
only urged a march on Bokhara, but also contemplated sending a Mission to Kokand, in order, as he
said, 'to frustrate the knavish tricks of the Russians
in that quarter.'
Our position, however, at that time was sufficiently
precarious without adding to our anxieties by

' I n the life of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, it is stated
t b t the alleged treachery of Mehrab Khan, which cost him his life,
We8 on raubsequent inquiry not confirmed.
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THREATENED REVOLT
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distant expeditions in Central Asia, even had tile
Russians established themselves in the Principalities,
which at that time was not the case. Not only was
Afghanistan itself seething with treachery and
intrigues from one end to the other, but the Siklls
in the Punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since the death
of Runjeet Singh, become disloyal and out of hand.
Beloocllistan was in tumult ; the tribes in the Kyber,
ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened our
cominunications ; so that we were certainly i n no
condition to enter upon further dangerous expeditions against distant imaginary foes.
Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief,
strongly objected to any advance. ' I n truth,' he
said, ' we are much weaker now than in 1838.'
During the latter months of 1840, and in 1841,
matters became steadily worse, and all Afghanistan
seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stzw Iiere,'
wrote Sir William McNaghten in September ; ' it is
reported that the wliole country on this side tlle
Oxus is up in favour of Dost Mahomed, who is
certainly advancing in great strength.' Again, in a
letter to Lord Auckland, he said ' that affairs in this
quarter have the worst possible appearance '-and
he quoted the opinion of Sir Willoughby Cotton, tllat
' unless the Bengal troops are installtly strengthened
we cannot hold tlie country.'
At this criticaI period, however, Dost Mahomed
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distant expeditions in Central Asia, even lla(l tile
Russians established themselves in the Principnlities,
which at that time was not the case. Not only mas
Afghanistan itself seetlling with trencllery
intrigues from one end to the other, but tlle Siklls
in the Punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since tlle deatll
of Runjeet Singh, become disloyal and out of hand.
Beloochistan was in tumult ; the tribes in the Iiyber,
ever ready for mischief, incessantly tlire,zte~iedour
com~nu~rications
; so tllat we mere certai~llyin no
coiidition to enter upon further dangerous espcditioils against distant imagina~yfoes.
Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Comm,z~ider-in-Chief,
strongly objected to any advance. ' 111 trutli,' lie
said, ' we are much weaker now than in 1838.'
During the latter months of 1840, snil in 1841,
matters became steadily worse, and all Afghanistan
seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stew here,'
mote Sir William McNaglltei~in September ; 'it is
reported that the whole country on this side tlie
Oxus is up in favour of Dost Maliorned, who is
certainly advancing in great strength.' Again, in a
letter to Lord Auckland, he said ' that affairs in this
quarter have the worst possible appearance'-and
he quoted the opinion of Sir Willougl~byCotton, that
' unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengtheued
we cannot hold the country.'
At this critical period, I~owever,Dost Mahomed
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was heavily defeated at Bamian, on tlie Hind00
~ ~ o s lvoluntarily
l,
surrendering sllortly afterwards,
and for the moment prospects looked brighter ; but
the clouds soon gathered again, and the end was a t
hand.
The Governor-General of India had throughout
the whole war wisely and steadfastly resisted the
proposed further operations in Central Asia ; and
the Court of Directors in London wrote as follows :
' We pronounce our decided opinion that, for many
years to come, the restored monarchy will have need
of a British force in order to maintain peace in its
own territory, and prevent aggression from without.'
And they go on : ' We again desire you seriously
to consicler which of the two alternatives (a speedy
retreat from Afghanistan, or a considerable increase
of the military force in that country) you may feel i t
your duty to adopt. We are convinced that you
have no middle cour,se to pursue with safety a n d
with honour.' The Government of India, hesitating
to the last, failed in adopting either of the alternatives.
I n November, 1841, Sir Alexander Burnes vas
treacherously murdered by a mob in Cabul, which
was followed by an insurrection, andsthe defeat of our
troops.. General Elphinstone, who was in command,
writing to Sir 3V. McNaghten on November 24, said
that ' from the want of provisions and fmage, the

'1841
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A DISASTROUS RETREAT
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reduced state of our troops, the large number of
wounded and sick, the difficulty of defending the
extensive and ill-situated cantonment we occupy, the
near approach of winter, our communications cut off,
no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms
against us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any
longer to maintain our position in this country, and
that you ought to avail yourself of the offer to
negotiate that has been made to you,'
This was conclusive. Our Envoy early in December met the Afghan chief&and agreed that we sliould
immediately evacuate the country, and that Dost
Mahomed, who was in exile in India, should return.
On December 23, Sir William McNaghten was
treacherously murdered at a conference with the
Afghan Sirdars, within sight of the British cantonment, and then came the end.
The British force at Cabul, leaving its guns,
stores and treasure behind, commenced its retreat on
January 6, 1842; but incessantly attacked during
its march, and almost annihilated in the Koord Cabul
Pass, it ceased to exist as an organised body.
General Elphinstone and other officers, invited to a
conference by Akbar Khan, were forcibly detained as
hostages, and on January 13 a solitary' Englishman
(Dr. Brydon) arrived at Jellalabad, being, with
the exception of a few prisoners, the sole remaining
representative of the force.

-
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I have given this short sketch of the first Afghan
mar because, disastrous as it was, the causes of our
failure were due throughout far more to rash and
mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the
British troops engaged. Kaye in his 'History ' gives a
clear summary of its original object and unfortunate
results : ' The expedition across the Indus was undertiken with the object of creating in Afghanistan a
barrier against encroachment from the west.' ' The
advance of the British army was designed to check
the aggression of Persia on the Afghan frontier, and
to baffle Russian intrigues by the substitution of a
friendly for ail unfriendly Power in the countries
beyond the Indus. After an enormous waste of
blood and treasure, we left every town and village
of Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before
the British army crossed the Indus the English name
had been honoured in Afghanistan.
Some dim
traditions of the splendour of Mr. Elphinstone7s
Mission had been all that the Afghans associated
with their thoughts of the English nation, but in
their place we left galling memories of the progress
of a desolating army.'
The history of the war from first to last deserves
careful consideration ; and if the lessons taught by
it are taken to heart, they w i l l materially assist in
determining the principles which should guide our
policy on the North-West frontier of India.

CHAPTER I1
EVENTS PRIOR, AND LEADING UP, 'PO SECOND
AFGFIAN WAR

Conquest of Xhiva, Bolrharrt, and Rokand by Russia-British Conquest
of Scinde end tho Punj&ub-Our Policy with the Frontier T'ibesTranty of 1857 with Dost Mahorned-Shere Ni succeeds as Ameer,
1868-Wns of 1878-Abdul Rnhmnn becomes Ameer--Withdrawal
of British Army from Afghanistan, 1881.

FORa few years subsequent to the war, our frontier
policy happily remained free from complications, and
it will be desirable now to refer sliortly to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and of her conquests
of the decaying Principalities of Khiva, Bokhara and
Kokand.
Previous to 1847 the old boundary line of
Russia south of Orenburg abutted on the great
Kirghis Steppe, a zone (as the late Sir H. Rawlinson
told us) of almost uninhabited desert, stretching
2,000 miles from west to east, and nearly 1,000 from
north to south, which bad hitherto acted as a
buffer between Russia and the Mahornedan Principalities below the Aral.
'It was in 1847, contemporaneously ~ i t hour
' Parliamentary Papers : Afghanistan, 1878.
2

Extract from Quarterly Reuiew, October 1866.
C
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final conquest of the Punjaub, that the curtain rose
on the aggressive Russian drama in Central Asia
which is not yet played out. Russia had enjoyed
the nominal dependency of the Kirghis-Kozzacks of
the little horde who inhabited the western division
of the great Steppe since 1730; but, except in the
immediate vicinity of the Orenburg line, she had
little real control over the tribes. In 1847-48, however, she erected three important fortresses in the
very heart of the Steppe: These important worksthe only permanent constructions which had hitherto
been attempted south of the line-enabled Russia, for
the first time, to dominate the western portio~lof the
Steppe and to command the great routes of communication with Central Asia. But the Steppe forts
were after all a mere means to an end ; they formed
the conilecting link between the old frontiers of the
empire and the long-coveted line of the Jaxartes,
and simultaneously with their erection arose Fort
Aralsk, near the embouchure of the river.'
The Russians having thus crossed the great
desert tract and established themselves on the
Jaxartes (Sir Daria), from that time came permanently
into contact with the three D a n a t e s of Central Asia,'
and their progress since that date has been comparatively easy and rapid.
The Principalities had no military organisation
which would enable them to withstand a great Power ;
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their troops and those of Russia were frequently in
conflict of late years ; but the battles r e r e in a
military sense trivial ; and the broad result is, that
Eussia has been for some years predominant throughout the whole region ; and her fronsiers are now
contilluous with the northern provinces of both
Afghanistan and Persia. I t is this latter point which
is the important one, so far as we are concerned, but
before entering into its details, it will be well to
consider the nature of the great country over which
ltussia now rules.
Until within the last few years our information
as to its general character was very limited ; but the
accounts of numerous recent travellers all concur
in describing it as consisting for the most part of
sterile deserts, deficient in food, forage, fuel and
water. There are a certain ilumber of decayed
ancient cities here and there, and there are occasional oases of limited fertility, but the general
conditions are as just described. Witli the exception
of the one railway from the Caspian to Samarcand,
the means of transport are chiefly pack nnimaly.
Speaking roughly, the dominions of Russia in Central
Asia, south of Orenburg, may be taken as almost
equal in geographical extent to those of our Indian
&pire ; but there if; this striking difference betmeen
the two, that whilst the population of India is conlpqted at 250 millions, that of Central Asia, even ;at
c2
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the highest computation, is only reckoned at four o r
five millions, of mhom nearly half are nornaclicthat is, they wander about, not from choice, but in
search of foocl and pasturage.
The extreme
scantiness of the population is of itself a rough
measure of the general desolation.
The military position of Russia in Central Asia,
therefore, is that of a great but distant Power, which
during the last fifty years has overrun and taken possession of extended territories belonging to fanatical
Mahornedan tribes. The people themselves are,
many of them, marlike and hostile ; but they are badly
armed, h w e no discipline, training, or leaders, and are
not therefore in a position to vithstand the advance
of regular troops. Consequently Russia is enabled to
hold the couiltry with a comparatively small force of
scattered detachments, which are, however, supplied
with arms, munitions and stores under great difficulties from far distant centres, and her troops are
practically incapable of concentration. Indeed the
farther they go the weaker they become ; the very
magnitude of the area being an additional cause of
weakness. This is a condition somewhat precarious
in itself, and would certainly not appear to be a n
alarming one as a basis of attack against our Empire,
even were India close at hand.
While Russia, however, was completing the
subjugation of the Principalities, and advancing her
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frontiers until they became conterminous with the
nortlicrn provinces of Afghanistan and Persia, the
Government of India, by the great wars of 1843 and
1849,. '''j~avin~
annexed Scinde ancl the Pmljaub,
advailced our frontiers in a sinlilar manner, so that the
people both of Beloochistan aiid Afghanistan, hitherto
far remote from our dominions, now became our
neighbours.
In the life of Sir Robert Sandeman receiitIy
published, a very interesting account is given, not
only of the nature of the country along tlie border,
but of the policy pursued for many years with the
independent tribes. It says : 'By the conquest of
Scincle i11 1843, and the annexation of tlie Punjaub in
1849, the North-West frontier of India was advanced
across the river Indus to the foot of the rocky
mountains which separate the plains of the Indus
vaIley from the higher plateaus of Afghanistan and
Khelat. These rnou~itaiiz ranges formed a vast
irregular belt of independent or semi-independent
territory, extending from Cashmere southward to the
sea near Kurrachee, a total length of about 1,200
miles.' The belt of territory above described was
"nhabited by fierce marauding tribes, often at war
with each other, ever and anon harrying the plains
of the Punjaub and Scinde, and the constant terror
of the trade caravans duriizg their journey through
the passes.'
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The policy pursued for many years is thus described : ' The disasters of the first Afghan war, and
the tragical episode of Klielat, were fresh in men's recollections, and created a strong feeling against political interference with tribes beyond our border ' . . .
'Accordingly, from the rery first, the system of
border defence maintained by the Pulijaub Government v-as not purely military, but partly military,
pal'tljr political and conciliatory. While the passes
were carefully x-atchecl, every means was taken for
the promotion of friendly intercourse.' Roads were
niade, steamers started on the Indus, and iiluildation
canals developed along the border.
So long as they were friendly the tribesmen had
free access to our territory, could llold lalzd, enlist in
our army, and ~llakefree use of our marlrets. As
a result, tlie deadly hatred formerly prevailirig between tlie Sikhs and the hill tribes soon disappeared ;
raids became exceptional ; cultivation increased ; the
bazaars of our frontier stations teenzed with Afghans,
with trains of laden camels, who at the close of the
season returned laden with our goods. Disputes
vere volulltarily referred by independent tribesmen
for the arbitration of British officers. Such (it is
stated in the life of Sir Robert Sandeman) were the
results of Lawrence's frontier policy, and no words
are required to emphasise these excellent arrange-

.

ments, which remained in force for many years.
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Before leaving this part of the subject, it may be
as well to anticipate a little and to allude to the
successful part taken by Sir Robert Sandeman in
1876 on his appointmelll; as our agent to the hllan
of Khelat. I t is importarit in the first place to
mention, that whilst in Afghanistan the tribes all
along the frontier were for tlie most part independenl; of the Ameer of Cabul, and were ruled by
their own ' jirgahs ' or councils, in Beloochistan the
mode of government was fio far different that tlie
chiefs, whilst acknowledging the Khan as their
hereditary ruler, were entitled, not only to govern
their own tribes, but to take part in the general
administration of the country as the coizstitutional
advisers of the paramount chief. Tlie dangers
arising from the viciility of three powerful kingdoms,
Persia, Afghauistall arid Scinde, had no doubt led
them to perceive the ilecessity of co-operation, whicll
was established about the middle of the eighteenth
century. Although the collstitution as above described secured to the confederated tribes nearly a
century of prosperity and peaceful government, it so
happened that for some years before 1876, o~vingto
the weakness of the then ruler, and partly to
turbulence of the chiefs, the government of the
country fell into disorder, and the commerce
through the Bolam Pass altogether ceased.
' From 3872 to 1876 Lord Northbrook was Viceroy
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of India, and one of his last acts before leaving was
the appointment of Colonel Sandeman as our Envoy,
vith a view to nlediate between the Khan and his
subordinates, and which proved successful. The
principal terms which were finally accepted by the
Khan and his tribal chiefs were, that their Foreign
policy was to be under onr guidance, and we were also
to be the referee in case of internal disputes ; that
the commerce. of the Bolam was to be opened and
protected, the annual subsidy hitherto granted to the
Klian of 5,0001. being doubled to cover the necessary
expenditure ; and, findy, that a British Agent with a
suitable contingent should be established at Quetta.
I t is important to observe that the negotiations were
conducted tl~roughontin a spirit of conciliation, and
that their beneficial results remain in force to the
present day.
The policy pursued for many years on the Afghan
frontier, altllough regulated by the same general
principles as in Khelat, was not alt>ogetherso rapidly
accomplished, or so entirely successful. The circumstances were in some degree different and less simple.
I n the first place the frontier was 800 miles long, and
was inhabited by Afghan tribes, who were more predatory and intractable than the Beloochees ; they were
not only independent of each other, but for the most
part acknowledged no allegiance to the Ameer of
Cabul. Border disputes therefore had to be settled
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v i t h individual chiefs ; and no opportunity aas
offered for our mediation in internal feuds, or for
joint agreement on external policy, as was so successfully accomplished by Sandeman in Beloochistan.
There was no general federation with which we could
enter into negotiation. As a consequence, we were
compelled to maintain a large force ailcl fortified
posts along the frontier; and many punitive expeditions became necessary from time to time against
lawless offending tribes. Still, on the whole, and
coilsidering the difficulties of the situation, the policy
of conciliation, subsidies, and of non-interference
with their internal affairs, gradually succeeded ;
raids once chronic became exceptional, and were
dealt with rather as matters of frontier policy than of
war.l
I t must also be remembered, as an additional
complication, that in annexiug the Punj aub, a1though
i t is essentially the country of the Sikhs, who are
Bindoos, the inhabitants of the trans-Indus districts
are for the most part what are termed Punjaubee
Mussulmen, that is, Afghans, in race, religion and
language.
From what has been said as to our dealings with
the border tribes, it will be evident that while our
difficulties were continuous and often serious, still,
See Parliamentary paper^: Afghanistam, 1878, page 30, and
Bsloochistan, No. 8, 1878.
.
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they were chiefly local ; and that the defence of the
Einpire on that frontier against foreign aggression
depended in a great measure on our relations with
the ruler of Afglianistan itself. When Dost Mahomed,
after the great war, returned in 1843 to his former
position as Ameer of that distracted country, it was
hardly to be expected that, although acquiescing in his
reinstatement, Ire should be regarded by him in a
friendly light ; still, some years passed away without
any important change in our relative positions, one
way or the other.
I11 1855, Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General,
and a treaty was made with Dost Mal~orned,by which
both parties agreed to respect each other's territories.
I n January, 1857, a still more important one followed.
We were then once more at war with Persia; and a t
a meeting between Sir John Lawrence and the Ameer,
an agreement was entered into that Dost Mahomed,
acting in co-operation with us, should receive 10,0001.
a montli for military purposes, to continue during
the war ; that English oficers should reside in his
country temporarily, to keep the Indian Government
infomecl, but not to interfere with the administration,
and that when peace ensued they should be withdrawn, and a native agent alone remain as our
repre~entative.~I t is important to note that this

' In view of the strong objection t o the presence of English officera
in Afghanistan, Sir John Lawrence intimated to the Viceroy of India,
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friendly treaty was made at Peshawur, just before the
great Mutiny, and that the Ameer, though urged by
his people to attack us in our hour of danger, remained faithful, and would not allow them to cross
the border.
Dost Mahomed died in June, 1863, and for some
years after 11is death family feuds and intestine wars
occurred as to his successor, during which we carefully abstained from interference, and were prepared
to acknowledge the defacto ruler. Ultimately, in 1868,
his son Shere Ali established his authority in Afgllanistan, and was acknowlerlged accordingly.
Lorcl.
Lawrence was then the Viceroy, and in a despatch
to the Secretary of State expressed his views as
regards the advances of Russia. After pointing
out that they were now paramount in Central
Asia, he suggested a mutual agreement as to our
respective spheres and relations with the tribes and
nations with whom we were now both in contact,
and he went on to welcome the civilising effect of
Russian government over the wild tribes of the
Steppes, and pointed out that if Russia were assured
of our loyal feeling in these matters, she would have
no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the
Afghans.
. The Secretary of State (Sir Stafford Northcote)
thet he had given an assurnnoe to Dost Mahomed that it shouldnot be
enforced unless imperatively necessary.
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rt.ij\it.d tllnt the c o ~ i q ~ ~ ewliich
s t s Russia had made,

atidnllp:tre~~tly
is still making, in Central Asia, appear
tile natural result of the circumstances in
~ ~ ~ b iPIIC'
~ * fillils
l ~ herself placed, and to afford 110
gn#uriil nvlieterer for representations indicative of
ni.ilit.il ~1 or alann on the part of this eou~ltry.' I t is a
gn.:~taiisfc~rtu~ie
that such sensible, conciliatory views
t l i t l !tot c*onti~lue
to guide our policy in the events
at:ii$l:Ll
'
i
w p a r s later led us into the second great
*.
\i:is irl ;\fghnl~istan.
+ltt.ri~Ali clici not inherit tlie great qualities of
hi- F..i:llor, : u ~ was
i
also somewliat discontented that
cn 1r;til not
betted llis cause during the internal
:tc lliPrlvs in A.fp1innistan. However, in 1869 he met
l i ~ ~ r1
t1l :~!.a) at Ulubxlla, and after careful discussion it
\,:a:~~rcc.cl
that we sliould abstain from sending
J!riti.l~ofiira~rsnctross the frontier and from interferilig ill ,\f'jIl:ul nihirs; tliat our desire was that a
+troi~g,
friendly, aud independent Government should
t~ eht:tl)lislle(i in tliat country. It a a s further
{lr.t*iclt*tl to give Sliere Ali considerable pecuniary
:i+i*t:~i~ce,
and presents of arms from time to time.
' 1 ' 1 1 ~Anleer, while gratified at these results, wished us
:rl*o to give x dynastic pledge as to his lineal descenjrt*

tlants, wllic11, however, was not acceded to. I n 1873
Iurd Sortllbrook was Viceroy of India, and a
further coriference took place at Silnla with t l ~ e
hileer's Prime uinister, elriefly as to the nortllern
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Afgllan frontier in Ba(1nkshan ancZ TVakkan, wliicll
were at the time somemllnt uncertnin, and a matter of
d i s p ~ ~wit11
t e Russia.
This sornewhat delicate question was, liolr-ever,
settled in a friendly manner by Lorci Gr:~nville,tllen
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Prince
Gortscllalroffs find despatcli to him on tlie sul~ject
was as f o l l o ~ :s' 'The divergence wllicll esis1,eil in
our views was with reg:~ril to the frontiers assigliecl
t.o the donliilion of Sliere Ali. Tlie E~iglisllGovc?niment includes witliin them Uadakslian nxlc2 TVakknn,
which according to our views enjoyed a certain
independeilce. Co~isideringthe dificultg experienced
in establishing the fr~clsin a11 tlieir details in tliose
distant parts ; consideririg tlle greater facilities wliicli
the British Government possesses for collectir~gprecise detail, and above all considering our misli not to
give to this question of detail greater irnportarice
than is due to it, we (10 not refilse to accept tlie
boundary line laid down by England. We are the
more inclined to tlJs act of courtesy as the English
Government engages to use a11 its influeilce wit11 Shere
Ali in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful
attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up a11
measures of aggression or further conquest. This
influence is indisputable. I t is based, not only on
the material and moral ascende~lcyof England, but
L

Central Asia, 1878-C. 6gS.
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also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted
to her. Such being the case, we see in this
assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of
pence.'
Prince Gortschakoff admitted more than once that
the Emperor of Russia looked upon Afghanistan as
completely outside the sphere of Russian influence,
and witliin that of ours ; at the same time, claiming
similar independence for Russia in Central Asia.
During the next few years, subsequent to the
Sim'la conference, Shere Ali, though he had received
considerable assistance from us, both in money and
arms, was not altogether satisfied, and one or two
incidentsoccurred during that period which gave him
umbrage. Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy in 1875, was
not unavare of tlie somewhat cold and capricious spirit
of the Ameer, but in writing to London h e pointed
out that Shere Ali's situation was difficult, not only
from the risk of revolution a t home, but also of
attack from abroad, but that on the whole he was to
be relied on.
A change, however, was coming over the scene,
and our policy reverted from conciliation to compulsion, I t was a critical period in the history of
frontier policy, and demands careful consideration.
I t must not be forgotten that although amongst
those best qualified to judge the majority had long
been opposed to advance and congueat in territories
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beyonrl our Nort1h-West frontier, anil entert;nined
but little fear of Russinu aggressive power, still there
were others-men
of long experience, mllo llnd
filled high positions in India-mllo held different
views ; and it is probd~le that not only snccessive
British Governments, but the public generally, ~vllo
have no time for caref~~llyweighing the diverse
aspects of the subject, mrere illfluencecl sometinlea one
connected with our world-wide Empire this illust
always be inore or less the case. For instance, the
late Sir H. Ramrlinson, a few pears before the seconcl
Afghan war, took a very alarmist view of the
progress of Russia, not oilly in Central Asia but
also in Asia Minor. He considered that her advance
from Orenburg mras only part of one great scheme of
iavasion ; ancl he averred that the conquest of the
Caucasus had given her such a strong position that
there was no military or pllysical obstacle to the
continuous march of Russia from the Arsxes to tlie
1ndus.l He described it as the unerring certainty of a law of nature. But, througllout, he
ignores distances, blots out the mountains, deserts,
and aricl plains of Persia and Afghanistan, and takes
no account of the warlike races who would bm t l ~ e
path. . I t requires a very large map to embrace all
the details of 'this widespread strategy.
.
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Sonle account has already been given of tlie
wenkness, iri a military poilit of view, of Russia in
Cjentral Asia, and of the distallce of h e r scattered
troops from the main resources of the Empire. But,
in addition, it must be remembered that t h e mountains of Afglianistan also forin a natural a n d enduring
l~nrrieragainst a furtlier advance. The great Hindoo
Koosh range, running all along the northern part
of tliat country, forins indeed the real scientific
frontier between tlie two Empires, the few passes
over its s11o~vycrests ranging from 12,000 t o 18,000
feet liigli, and only open for a few months i n the
pear.
rlilotlier supposed line of advance for a Russian
army, 11:mnlely by tlie Pamirs, has of late years beer1
brought forward; but its main features are more
discouraging tliail those of any other. This elevated
region coi~sistsof a Inass of bare snow-capped mountailis attaining elevations of over 25,000 feet, intersected by plateaux almost as devoid of vegetation as
the nlountains themselves. The lakes a r e about
12,000 feet above the sea, the population is scanty,
and consists chiefly of nomads in search of food and
pasture during tlie short summer ; so that although
the Russians might, if unop"posed, possibly move in
small isolated detachments carrying tlieir own food
and munitioris over the Pamirs, it would only b e t o
lose themselves in the gorges of the Himalayas.

1875
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The conditions above mentioned are for the most
part permanent. Russia may not, and probably has
not, any intention of trying to invade and conquer
India-but she has not the power, which is a far more
important consideration.
To return to the position of affairs previous to
the second Afghan war.l Early in 1875, Lord
Northbrook, the Governor-General, received a rlespatch from the Government at home, pointing out
that the infor ination received from Afghanistall, not
only in respect to internal intrigues but also as
regards the influence of foreign Powers, was scanty,
and not always trustworthy. He was, therefore,
instructed to procure the assent of the Ameer to the
establishment of a British Agency a t Herat, and also
at Candal~ar.
Tlie Viceroy of India and his Coullcil having consulted various experienced officers on the subject,
replied in June, that in their opinion the present
time and circumstances were unsuitable for taking
the initiative. They pointed out that the Sirdars
and many of the people of Afghanistan would st,rongly
object, and that i n the Ameer's somewhat insecure
position he could not afford to disregard their feelings
in the matter. They advised patience and conciliation.
See Afghanistan,1878,publishedby Secretery of Stste for India,
p. 128 et aeq.
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In November 1875 a second despatch was received
from England, reiterating the necessity of more complete information as to Afghanistan, especially in
view of recent Russian advances in Central Asia;
and the Viceroy was directed to send a Mission t o
Cabul without delay, to confer with the Ameer on
Central Asia, and requesting that British officers
should be placed on the frontier to match the course
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of events.
The Government of India, in January 1876, again
urged the undesirability of forcing the hands of the
Ameer, and pointed out that his objections to Eilglisli
officers mere not from a feeling of disloyalty, and that
to force his hands was not desirable. Tliey did not
apprehend any desire of interference on the part of
Russia, and they concluded by alluding to the careful
corlciliatory policy carried out by Lords Canning,
Lawrence, ancl Mayo, as giving the best promise of
peace, ancl seLisfactory results in Afghanistan. Consequently they deprecated the proposed action b y
the Home Government in forcing British officers upon
Shere Mi. I n April 1876 Lord Northbrook quitted
India, and was succeeded by Lord Lytton; and a
further reply from Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of
State for India, was received by the Viceroy, It
reiterated that the Government a t home considered,
our trans-frontier relations unsatisfactory ; that
permatlent British Agencies should be established Is!
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Afghanistan ; and that we were willing to athrd the
Allleer rnaterinl snppor t against urip revoked : I Z ~ ~ C S sion, our object being to rllaintniri a strong nncl
friendly Power in tliat c,ouiitrp. The despntcli went
on to say tlnL slroulcl the Anleer decline to meet our
request, lie slionlil l)e informerl tliat he was isolating
lliiilself from as at liis peril.
The next step mas t:~kcnin &lay, when tlie hmccr
was invited to lqeceive n special Mission, ~vliic!lille
politely declinecl. I n October our ilative Agent :it
Cabul caine to Siinln nnclhacl an interview wit11 Idorcl
1,g tton, ~vlioreiterated the clemnn(1s of the Urit is11
Goverinnent, pointing out that in tlic evelit of :E
refusal there was notliing to prevent onr joining
Russia in wiping dfghnnistnn out of the liinp altoyeQier, of wllicli Sliere Ali was duly iuforme(1. Iii
J:~nuaryIS77 a fiilsl elfix.-t wtls m:~dc to collie to
terms, and .Sir Lewis Pelly arlil the Afgllau Priinc
$Iinister, Noor Mnliorned, had a. collferclice at
Peshawur. The first, nn(l irlrleerl tlle only point
iliscusse(1, wa.s the deinnncl tliat British rt?pres(!lit:~tives should reside in Afghanistan, which was a
sine qua nnn. Noor Malloined pntliet,icn-llyplcatlerl
that Lorcls Lnt~rence,May o, and Nortllbrook, suceessive Vicerojrs, had a 1 in turn promised that this
sliould not be insisted on ; and lie ended by saying
that Sliere Ali would rather perish tlinli subillit. I t
r a s evident that further discussion was useless, and
n 2
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tile conference was closed ; Noor Mahorned, who was
ill, dying sliortly afterwards. I n March 1877 our

native Agent at Cabul was witlidrawn, and direct
conlzriunication wit11 Shere Ali ceased.
I have given the above ~dsurnkof the correspondence in 1875-77, and of the abortive efforts to induce
the Ameel- to comply with our demands, because it
is evident that if he continued to resist compulsion
lrlust almost inevitably ensue. At about the same
time, Quettn, in the Bolam, was occupied by a considerable British force, which was naturally regarded
as a threat on Afghanistan. A ~oncent~ration
of
troops also took place in the Northern Punjaub, and
preparations mere made for the constructioil of
bridges over the Indus. All these were indications
of coming war. It must also be noted that our
relations with Russia in Europe were much strained
at the time, so that probably the preparations in
India were in some degree due to tlie apprehension
of mar in otlier parts of the world.
d"3
I n the summer of 1878 a R~lssianEnvoy arrived
at Cabul, which under the circumstances is ,hardly to
he wondered at. Some months however elapsed,
and it was not until November 1878 that war was
declared. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, in his proclamation stated: That for ten years we had been
friendly to Bhere Ali ; had assisted him with money
and arms ; and had secured for him formal recog-
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SECOND AFGHAN WAR

nition of his northern frontier by Russia.' It went
on to state, tliat in return he had requited us witll
active ill-will; had closed the passes and allowed
British traders to be plundered ; ancl had endemoured to stir up religious hatred against us. I t
then pointed out that whilst refusing a British
Mission he had received one from Russia ; ancl elided
by saying that we had no quarrel with the Afghans,
but only wit11 Shere Ali himself.
From official correspondeilce published subscquentlyl it appeared that in entering Afghanistan
0111- chief object at the outset was to eslablisli hat
was called a strategical triangle, by the occupation of
Cabul, Ghuznee ancl Jellalabad ; and it mas statecl
that by holding this position, entrenched behind a
rampart of mountains, we should have the power of
debouching on the plains of the Oxus against
Russia in Central Asia ! ' I t is difficult,' said Lord
Lytton, ' to imagine a more commanding strategical
position.' The events of the war, I~owever,soon put
an end to this somewhat fanciful strategy.
In November 1878 the British forces entered the
eouiltry by three main routes, theKyber, the Koorum,
and the Bolam, and hard fighting at once ensued 01.the two northern ones. The results mere immediate :
Shere Ali fled northwards, and died soon after. His
soil, Yakoob Khan, assumed temporarily the positioii
Pmlilil~mentaryPapers, Afghanistan, 1881, No. 2.-c. 2811.
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of Ameer, but in the convulsed state of the country
he possessed little real power or authority. I n May,
1879, he met the British authorities at Gundamuk,
and after considerable discussion signed a treaty, the
chief points of which were as follows :-The foreign
affairs of Afghanistan were to be under our guidance;
and we ulldertook to support the Ameer against
foreign aggression ; British agents were to reside i11
tlie country ; the Koorum, Pisheen, ancl. Sibi Valleys
were assigned to the British Goverainent ; and finally,
Yalroob Khan was to receive an annual subsidy of
60,0001.
So far, it would appear as if the campaign had at
once realised the main objects of British policy ; but
tragic events rapidly followed, active hostilities mere
resumed, and t.he Treaty of Gundamuk became mere
waste paper.
As a first result of the treaty, Sir Louis Cavagnari was appointed our Envoy, and accompanied
l ~ ay few officers and a small escort, arrived at Cabul
in July, being received in a friendly manner by the
Anleer ; althougll influences adverse to his presence
in the capital soon became apparent. Suddenly, on
September 3, the British Residency was attacked by
several Afghan regiments, and after a desperate
resistance, Cavagnari and tlie whole of his officers
and escort perished.
Afghaniatam, 1881,No. 1,
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ABDICATION OF YAICOOB KHAN

This deplorable event, of course, upset all previous arrangements, and led to an immediate resumption of hostilities. Our troops at once advanced and
,aptured Cabul, Yakoob Khan voluntarily abdicating
becoming an exile in India. Ghuznee also was
occupied shortly afterwards by our advance from
Csndahar.
The Government of India, in a despatclz in
January, 1880, pointed out that, in view of the complete change in the political situation, it was necessary, in the first place, fully to establish our military
position in the country. They acknowledged that the
liopes entertained of establishing a strong, friendly,
and independent kingdom on our frontier had
collapsed ; and that Afghanistan had fallen to pieces
at the f i s t blow, its provinces being now disconnected and masterless. I n view of these unexpected
results, they went on to recommend the permanent
separatioii of the provinces under separate rulers ;
and having regard to the special difficulties connected with Herat, advocated its being handed over
to Persia !
This was indeed a policy of despair ! 3
Lord Hartington, who had become Secretary of
8 tate for India, writing in May, 1880, summed up the
situation as follows :-' It appears that as the result
of two successful campaigns, of the employment
of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of
I

I
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large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State
which it was desired to see strong, friendly and
independent ; the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and
a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of
the country.'
Long and careful consideration was naturally
given to the solution of the difficulty in which this
country found itself owing to the untoward circumstances just related. Two important decisions were
liowever ultimately arrived at :
I. That authority in Afghanistan, and the unity
of its provinces, should as far as possible be restored
by the appointment of a new Ameer ; and Abdul
Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, who had been for
twelve years an exile in Bokhara, was invited to
Cabul, and was supported by us in assuming the
title.
The chief conditions were, that his foreign policy
was to be under our guidance, that no English officers
were to reside as our representatives in Afghanistan,
and that he was to receive a subsidy.
2. That the British troops should be withdrawn
as soon as the pacification of the country would
permit. This decision was recommended not only
by the Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, but by t h e >

'
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higller officers who had held command cluriiig the
war. Sir ~ o n a l dStewart, who was in chief command, and Sir Frederick Roberts, both concurred in
our wit,hdrawal from the country ; the Kyber Pass was
to be held by subsidised tribes, and tlie Koorum Valley
to be altogether abandoned ; the indepenclence of
the tribes being in each case recognised. Sir John
Watson, who was in commaild in that valley, pointed
out that as a route from India into Afghanistan it
was practically useless. As a further argument in
favour of witlldrawal, it may be well to allude to
the fact that tlie men of our native re&'
+iments were
sick of serving in Afghanistan, far away from their
homes, and that it would be impolitic to keep them
there.
/Some differences of opinion existed as to whether
v e should relinquish possession of Candahar ; but as
it was 400 miles from the Indus, in a foreign
country, and as our remaining there would not only
be hateful to the Afghans, but in a military sense
would be dangerous and costly, its final abandonment
was decided on ; the valley of Pisheen, between
Candahar and Quetta, being alone retained by the
British Government. /
So ended the great war of 1878-80. At its close
we had over 70,000 men in Afghanistan, or on the
border in reserve ; and even then we really only held
the territory within range of our guns. The whole

'
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country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy ;
whilst the total cost, of the war exceeded twenty
millions sterling, being about the same amount as had
been expended in the former great was of 1839-41.
The military operations in themselves had been
conducted throughout with great skill in a most
difficult country, and the troops, both British and
Native, had provecl themselves admirable soldiers ;
but as regards the policy which led us into war, it
appears to have been as unjust in principle as it was
unfortunate in result. The facts, however, speak for
themselves. .
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CHAPTER 111
FRONTIEIt POLICY SINCE SECOND AFGHAN WAR,
IR'CLUDIBG EXPEDITION TO CI-TITRAL

Further Advance of Russia-Merv Occupied-Sir West Ridgeway's
Frontier Commission of 1885-The Durmd Agreement with Ahdill
Rahman-The Chitral Expedition of 1895 : its Results-Sudden
Outbreak of Frontier Tribos, 1897.

THE reaction after t,he war naturally inclined the
authorities in both countries to leave frontier policy
alone, at all events for the time. Our professed
object for years had been to make Afghanistan
strong, friendly, and independent. The first had
certainly not been accomplished, and the other two
were doubtful. Still, by patience, conciliation, and
subsidies, we might hope in the course of time that
the wounds we had inflicted would gradually be
healed, and a more stable condition ensue. For a
short period it was so; but then the old bugbear of
Russian advance over the dreary wastes of Central
Asia again supervened, and exercised its malign
influence 011 our policy.
In 1881 and the following years, Russia, whilst
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completing her conquests, and improving her communications in the south-western part of Central
Asia, became involved in somewhat prolonged
hostilities with the Tekke-Turcomans, ending in
their subjugation, and in the occupation of the
long, desolate strip of country extending eastwards
from the Caspian, which had hitherto been independent.
A railway was gradually constructed
from the vicinity of Kras-novodsk, on the Caspian,
towards Samarcand. Merv, formerly a city of
importance, but of late a mere village in the desert,
was also occupied. These acquisitions of Russia,
accomplished in districts far removed from India,
would not appear to involve any special consideration on our part; but as the southern frontiers of
Russia thus became conterminous for a long distance
with Northern Persia, and also with some districts of
Afghanistan, their new position was regarded as
possibly involving designs against our Indian Empire,
and remonstrances were made by us, more especially
as regards the occupation of 3Ierv.l '
I n a strategical point of view the question would
not appear to be of much importance, and would
probably have dropped; but 4early in 1885 tlie
Russians attacked and drove the Afghan troops out
of Penjdeh, a small, hitherto almost unknown village
in tlie desert. I t was a high-handed measure, and
Ceptral Aeia, No. 2,1885.
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tile relations between the two Governments, British
find Russian, which mere already rather drained,
became critical, and war at one moment appeared to
be all~lostinevitable.
I t is not necessary, nor would it be desirable, now
to recapitulate the details of this serious crisis;
because, happily, owing to the prudence exercised
by both Governments, the danger gradually passed
away, a Joint Camlnission being agreed on, to meet
on the frontier, and to report as to its delimitation.
"It may, llowever, be as well to mention that it seems
rather doubtful wllether Penjdeh at the time absolutely belonged to Afghanistan. Frontiers in the East
are proverbially uncertain and shifting, and in our
own official maps, not very long before the occurrences in question, it was marked as outside the
Afghan border. Colonel Stewart, reporting in 1884
on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, and alluding
to Penjdell, said that it was inhabited by Turcomans,
and he thus described the position : ' The state of
affairs seems to hare been that the Turcomans
acknowledged that they were squatting on Afghan
land, and were liable to pay taxes, and each year
they paid something as an acknowledgnlent of
Afghan rights ; but so long as this was done, the
Afghans looked upon them as a protection against
the Tekke further north, and left them very much to
.themselves.'
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The appointment of a Joint Commission of Russian
and British officers to delimit the northern frontiers
of Afghanistan proved of great value, not only in
pining information regarding districts hitherto but
little known, but also because its conjoint work
tended to engender feelings of respect and goodwill
between the two ilations concerned.
Its labours commenced in the autumn of 1885,
and the report of Sir West Ridgeway, the British
Commissioner, is full of interest and encouragement.
In an article in the ' Nineteenth Century ' of October,
1887, on the coinpletion of his work, he gives some
details of the country, and also of the position of
Russia in Central Asia, which are worth quoting. As
to the Afghan border he says: 'The three or four
hundred miles of country through which the new
north-western frontier of Afghanistan runs is a
sandy, treeless, waterless desert, except where it is
traversed froin south to north by tlie Heri-Rood, the
Murghab and the Oxus. The only cultivable ground is
on the banks of these rivers ; but in spring time, afLer
the winter snows have melted, the intervening plains
afford good grazing for sheep.' But perhaps the
most important part of his article is his view of the
position of Russia in Central Asia : ' If any Russian
general,' he writes, ' were so reckless as to attempt
the invasion of India, ancl relying on the single line
of lightly constructed rails which connects the Caspian
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Tvithtile Oxus, and which are liable in summer $0 be
bloclred by the moving sands of the desert, and in
winter by the falli~lgsllows of Reaven-if, relying on
this frail and precarious base, he were to move an
srnly tl~roughthe barren plains bordering: the Oxus,
nncl
leaving in his rear the various hostile and excited
races of Central Asia, he mere to cross the difficult
pa~gesof the IIilldoo Koosh, and entangle his army
in tlle barren mountain homes of the fanatical and
treac11e1-ous Afghan, then indeed our fortunate
generals may well congratulate themselves that the
Lord has delivered tlie enemy into their hand. . . .'
Whilst, lzowever, his conclusions as to the military
weakness of Russia in that part of the worlcl are
clear aid decisive enough, he at the same time does
full justice to the good work whicll she is carrying
out in tliat vast area. He says : 'Hitherto Russia's
advzllice in Central Asia has been the triumph of
civilisation. Wherever she has planted her flag
slavery has ceased to exist. This was keenly brought
home to us in the course of our travels. For hulldreds of miles before we reached Herat we foulla the
counlry desolated and depopulated by Turcomall
raids, while even in the Herat valley we contillually
came across the fathers and brothers of nlen who ha$
been carried off from their peaceful fields by
stealillg Turcomans, and sold into slavery many bundred miles away. All this has ceased since the
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Russian occupation of Merv ; the cruel slave trade
has been stamped out. . . .'
Lord Salisbury, speaking in 1887, at the conclusion
of the frontier clelimitation, happily described the
situation as follows : 'Ivalue the settlement for this
reason-not that I attach much importance to the
square miles of desert land with which we have been
dealing, and which probably after ten generations of
mankind will not yield the slightest value to any
human being : but the settlement indicates on both
sides that spirit which in the two Governments is
consistent with continued peace. There is abundant
room for both Governments, if they would only think
so. . . .' What a pity that some statesman could
not have persuaded England to that effect fifty years
before !
During the next few years no events of special
importance occurred to affect our general frontier
policy in India, so far as Russia and Afghanistan
proper are concerned. The ample information we
now possess of the relative power and position of
each country, and the experience gained in bygone
wars, enable us to form a correct judgment of the
great strength of our Empire in the East ; and it is
to be hoped that in the future we shall hear less o f
those alarmist views wliich have so frequently led u s
into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions.
Russia and England are now, happily, on friendly
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terms, and Abdul Rahman, the Alneer of Cabul,
altho~gllhis position is difficult in the midst of a
turbulent people, has proved himself a. loyal neigllbour.
But another cloud has appeared on the horizon,
and our troubles wit11 the intervening frontier tribes
are now apparently worse than ever. Prom accounts
already given of those who dwell along the border, it
is evident that although our differences w i ~ hthem,
during past years, have been frequent and often
serious, they have been more or less of a locd
character. Troublesome as our neighbours have
proved, still they h a ~ ~
noe power of inflicting serious
ii~jury,or of endangering our rule. Under tlicse
circumstances, the best policy, ml~ilstfirmly repressing their predatory instincts, is to leave them a l o ~ e .
I11 the absence of full official infoilation as to
the origin of recent difficullies, which have culminated in the present frontier war, it is only possible to
speak in general terms. I t may be mentioned, in
the first place, that owing to the uncertain line of
demarcation between the territories of tlie Anleer of
Cabul and those of his independent tribal neigllbours,
constant feu& and local liostilities occurred from
time to time in the mountains; and with a viev of
defining their respective spheres, the Government of
India, in 1893, sent a Mission to Cabul for the purpose.
This in itself would appear to have been a reasonrtl~le
E
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step ; and the 'Durand Agreement ' which ensued
(but which has not been published) would, it was'
hoped, tend to a cessation of conflicts between the
Ameer's subjects and their neighbours. But there
is a further aspect; of the question. So far as is
known, not only were the respective borders laid
down, but it is understood that in nlany cases the
interrening tribes are now ,assumed to be what is
termed ' within the sphere of British influence.' I n
maps recently published, presumably with some
authority, vast mountainous districts are now
included in this somewhat nlysterious phrase. For
instance, the Koorum Valley, the Samana Range, the
countries of the Afredis and the Mohmunds, the
districts of Chitral, Bajour, Dir, Swat, Bonair, and
others, are all included within it ; and in many
instances fortified positions, occupied by British
troops, are t o be fonnd either within or along their
borders.
Surely this opens out a wide question, and it
would be interesting to know whether, in the
discussions at Cabul, the chiefs of the intervening
tribes were present, and vhether they acquiesced,
not only in the new boundaries, but also in being
included as within our sphere of influence ? I t is
evident it should have been a tripartite, and not a
dual, agreement. It is perfectly well known, and
has been proved by long experience, that these
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frontier tribes value their inclepcndencc a1lil liberties
l~eyondeverytlling else, and will not submit peacefully to irrterfereiice ; and if they ere riot collsulterl
ill the arrangements just ilescribed, rve lllny begin to
trace the origin of the present crisis.
Although, ns I have espl:~ineil, we are unxl~le,
from mant of ofIicial information, to cied f~illv~ v i t l ~
the larger topic of recent border policy, me ~~:LTTC,
at
a11 events, ample details as regards the C!llitr:~l
question in the Parliamentary Papers pnblisllcti iu
1895. It appears that so long ago as Is:(; the
ruler of Cllitral voluntarily tendel.ecl his allryinncc to
the MallarLzjal~of Cashmere, and encicavo~tretl,btlt
witllont success, to persuade the neiglibouri~lgchiers
of Swat, Bajonr, and Dir, to follow liis cxnmple.
Now Chitral and Caslimere are not only far :q~art,
but are separated by lofty monnt,zin ranges, i~ihnl~ited
by other tribes, so tlial; this suciilen ofkr of vassalage
seems rather inexplicable. It transpired, 11011-ever, :L
few years afterm~a~ds,
that his r e d ~notivein seeliirlg
the friendship of Cashmere was due to his fcw of
aggression by the Anleer of C a b ~ l . ~
The Governmeilt of Inciia at the time encour:~ged
this somewhat sentimelltd friendship, and in order
to obtain influence over the intervening tribes
established a fort at Gilgit, in nn alnlost inaccessible
position, not far from the snowy crests of the Hindoo
1
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Icoosh. The position, however, proved to be costly,
also dangerous from unfriendly neigllbours, and,
as after three years' experience no special object
was attained, it was witl~drawnin 1881.
In 1889 the old fears of possible Russian aggression again revived, and Gilgit was reoccupied with a
strong detachinent of Cashmere troops, accompanied
by several English officers. The Government of
I ~ ~ d pointed
ia
out that the development of Russian
military resources in Asia rendered it necessary t o
watch the passes over the mountains, in order to
prevent what was called a c o z p de naain from the
north. In short, they dreaded the march of a
Russian army over the Pamirs and the Hindoo
Koosh-a region where Nature has constructed for u s
perhaps one of the most formidable frontiers in the
world.
Friel-~dsliip with the ruler of Chitral was a l s o
cultivated. He was given an annual subsidy, and a
present of 500 Sniders ; being visited also by English officers. It was even contemplated at the t i m e
to construct a direct road from his capital to o u r
frontier near Peshswur ; but as he was suspicious,
and as his neighbonrs in Swat, Bajour, and o t h e r s
would probably have objecl;ed, the suggestion w a s
happily pos Lponed.
I n October 1892 the ruler of Chitral died, a n d
after the usual family contests and intrigues, N i z a m
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ul-Mnlk, liis son, establisliecl liis authority in tilt!
country.
111 January, 1899, nr. Rol~crtsoii arsivcid at
Cliitral as our representatii-e, accoiul):lnicd l ~ ytwo
officers and fifty Siklis, hltllougll Ile was receivtld
in a frienrlly mnlliler by tlie new ruler, his ac>co~ult
of the state of affairs in April Kns iliscoul.:lginS :nit1
ominous. He wrote : 'JITe src~llto l)e on s YO~C:LI~O
here. Matters are no longer inipro~~ing
; tlie aliilosphere of Cliitral is one of cunspir:lcy :uld intrigue.'
A few weeks Inter he gave a rnore cliclerf'til account,
xncl although he descril~edthe pcoldc :IS ficlclc, II(J
consicierecl that I3nglishmen were s:~fo. It becnnlt~
evident, however, that the Kix:11n-nl-;\lnlk was weak
and unpopular, a ~ l dDr. liol~ertson descriI>cil tlic
coniltry as ' in a distracted state, mcl torn by f:wt ions.'
Tlie reports of our ilgent, in short, woulil sccili to
prove that lie was in a false ancl dangerous l~osition,
a small escort, far away i i ~the mount:ii~i~,
about 200 miles froin our frontier.
I n J,znuary, 1896, tlie Nizaln was murilered I)y
his brother, and the mllole coulitry nt once ngnill
feu into anarchy. Dr. Robertson, ~vlloh:id bee11
temporarily absent, but llad returned ill Febroar~,
was besieged in a fort, ~ ~ i this
~ l lescort, ~ I l i c h ]lo%-,
ever, llad been increased to about 290 men. The
crisis llad come at last, and there \~.r;lsno time to
spare.

--

--
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A strong force under Sir Robert Low was
asselnbled at Peshatvur, and crossed the frontier on
April 1. I t inust be poiilted out that, in proceediilg
to Chitral, the British troops had necessarily to pass
through a difficult mountaillous country inhabited by
ilideyenclent tribes; and the Government of India
issued a proclamatioll in which they pointed out
that tlieir sole object ' is to put an end to the
present and to prevent any future ulllawful aggressioa
on Chitral territory, and that as soon as this object
has been attained the force would be withdrawn.'
The proclamatio~lwent oil to say, that the Governilleilt ' have no inteiltioli of permanently occupying
any territory thro~zghwhich Mura Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering
~ vtlii the illdependence of the tribes.'
The military operations were conducted with
great skill and rapidity, and Dr. Robertson's small
garrison, which at one time had been hard pressed, was
saved : a sruaLl force under Colonel Kelly, which had
left Gilgit, having by a daring and successful march
arrived just before the main body from Peshawur.
The short campaign having thus acconlplished its
object, the gradual withdrawal of the British troops
in accordance with the proclamation woulcl seem to
have been R natural sequence. In the weak, distracted state of the country, and in the assumed
necessity of not loaiug our influence in those clistant
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regions, the Government of Inrlia, however, considered
that a road from our frontier to Chitral sliould belllade,
and certain positions retained in order to guartl it.
This vital question having been carefully co~lsiciered
a t home, the Secretary of State for Inclifi, on Juilr,
13, 1895, telegraphed to the Viceroy that her
Majesty's Government regretted they were uilable to
concur in the proposal. He went on to s:~ytlmt 110
' military force or European Agent shall be kept at
Cliitral; that Chitral sllould not be fortified ; silil
that no road shall be made between P e s h n ~ ~ uand
r
Chitral.' He adcled that a11 positions beyond our
frontier should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed.
I t so happened that within a few days of this impor taut decision a cliange of Governme11t occurre(2
a t home, and the question was recoilsidered; arid o i ~
August 9, fresh instructions were telegraphed to
Inclia, by which it was ordered that British troops
ahould be stationed at the Malalrund Pass, leading
into Swat, and that other posts up to, and including,
Chitral, should also be held, and a road made
through the country. I n short the previous decision
was entirely reversed.
Before going further it may be as well to point
out that this is no mere question between one political party and another. I t goes far beyond that, and
we may feel assured that in considering the subject,
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both Governments were actuated by a desire to do
what was considered best in the interests of the
Indian Empire.
Still, it is I think impossible not to regard tlia
ultimate decision as very unfortunate, and as likely
I

1
1

to lead to serious consequences. In a mere military
point of view, it was a. repetition of the policy
pursued of recent years of establishing isolated.
military posts in countries belonging to others, or
in their vicinity ; inevitably tending to aggravate
the tribes, and which in time of trouble, instead of
increasing our strengtl~, are and have bee11 the
cause of anxiety to ourselves. Therefore, not only
as a matter of policy, but in a purely military
sense, the arrailgenlent was dangerous.
1would further observe that many officers, botli,
civil and military, inen of the highest chahcter and
long experience in the Punjaub and its borders, did
not; hesitate to express tlieir opinions at the time,
that retribution mould speedily follow,; and their
anticipations appear now to have been verified.
Suddenly, not many weeks ago, the people of Swat,,.
who were said to be friendly, violently attacked our
position on the Malakund, losing, it is said, 3,000
men in the attempt ; and also nearly captured a
fortified post a few miles distant at Chakdara. Not
only that, but this unexpected outbreak was followed
by hostilities on the part of the tribes in Bajour, and
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l ~ yllie AIolini~uiilsnorth uf I'cdl:rwur, :ln(l also 1)y
tlio ~lfretiis,T Y ~ I O , sul)sidi.st~(l1ry us, llntl for years
gnarlled the ce1cbr:rteil Iiybcr. 12g:ri11, thtt tri1~c.s
of the S,am:ttia range, n~idotllcrs to tllti ~ v t ~ofs t Iicsh:it,
rosc: in :lrins ; nilcl n vc:ry 1:trgc forcbr ~rfIlritisl~trool~s
llnti to be l)nslir?ilfor~v:~rd
i11 :dl 1i:lstc: to qat111 t11is
great co~nl~i~ir?d
attack 011 tlle prrt of our 11ei~11bours. C;e~ier:ll Sir XeviHc C'lifill~l)rrl:ii~i,
l)crl~:~ps
tlle gre:ltcst liviiig nntliori ty on fror\tic~rclrtcstio~ls,
118s ~rrittcriquite reccritly, 1)~)i1ltitlg
out tli:~t ~lt~vvr
previously 11:1ii tliere l~r!c~nn scuil)l:~ncvo f ~~iiit!.of
:~ctioii;tniougst the c1iKcrent tri1)estucu.'
lllerc snrcly n ~ n s tlmve 11cc.11sorur vtlry strolig
keliilg of resciztiiieut mil i11j11stic.cn.liiiall l)rrrt~ghtSO
mm-iy tril)csmcl~for tlie first tiiilc to cv~n\)illt!ill
ol~position to ~vlint they eviilciitly c*oi~sitlcrild:lu
invnsion of their coniltry. 11s rtynrils tllc :\1'1-t>rlis,
wlio are spoke11 of as treacherous :uid f;iitl~\t~ss,
it,
mnst be I~onicin ~iliililt1i:~tin 1881 v t : sl~oc~iallj.
recogniscd tllcir inciepencierice,' :uid liave crtbrsi11c1t!
sul)siilise(I tllelll for the sl)eci:~l1)urpose of pu:tnliiig
tdie colrlrnerce througl:l1 tlie Icybcr; :L iitity m-llicll
they llavc f:titllfully carried out until tlie prest>iit
summer. Lord Lytton, ~;*lio1 ~ 3 sViceroy \vlion the
arranpeillellt was proposed at the encl of the war,
wrote in 1880 3-L I sincerely hope that the GovernI 1

' Saturday Reuietu,

80th Oct. 1897.
Ajgl~aniafanNo. 1, 1881, page 57.

Ibiil, pngo 62.

INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY

168

1897

merit of India will not be easily persuaded to keep
troops perinanently stationed in the Kyber. I feel
i little doubt that such a course would tend rather to
cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of
troops would be a constant provocation to attack ;
large bodies woulcl die like flies. . . . .'
'1 believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if
properly nlanaged, will prove the best guardians of
tlie Pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it
open for us, if we make it wort11 their while to do
SO.

. . . .)

Many of these very men, and those of other tribes
on the frontier, have for years enlisted in our ranks,
and have proved to be good soldiers. I repeat that
some strong cause must have influenced them sudclenly to break out into war.
Until the present military operations have been
brought to a close, and until full official information
has been given of the circumstances which have led
t o them, it is not possible to pronounce a final
judgment ; still, it seems to me, that we have strong
grounds for believing that the border policy of late
pears has in many instances been too aggressive and
regardless of the rights of the tribes ; and that the
course finally pursuedof the retention of fortified posts
through Swat and Bajour to Chitral, has been the
ultimate cause which has excited the people against
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us, and produced so great and costly a border var.
It must also not be forgotten, that even nom we are
merely on tlle fringe, as it were, of the question ; and
that if we persist in forcing ourselves forward, we
sllall have many a costly campaig~lto undertake far
away in distant, little-knoan regions, more difficult
and more inaccessible even than those in vhich we
now find ourselves.
On the wliole it appears to ine that we sl~oulilas
far as possible wichdraw our isolatecl posts, so many
of tv11ich are either within the tribal country or along
its borders. I t is sometimes argued that any withdrawal on our part would have a demoralising effect
on the tribes, tvho would ascribe our retirement
to inability to maintain our positions.' Tlie best
reply will perhaps be to quote the words of Lord
TIartington, when under similar circulnstances it was
decided in 1881 to retire from Candahar. He said : '
'The inoral effect of a scrupulous adherence to
declarations which have been made, and a striking
and convincing proof given to the people and princes
of India that the British Government have no desire
for further annexation of territory, could not fail
to produce a most salutary effect, in removing the
apprehensioas, and strengthening the attachment of
Chiikal, 1895, page 62.
I

"Afghanistan, No. 1, 1881, page 92.
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our native allies tl~rougl~outIndia, alld on our
frontiers. . , . .'
These remarks may now be brought to a close.
My object throughout has been to give an historical
suinnlary of the various wars and expeclitions in
which y e have been engaged during the present
century on the North-West frontier of India ; and of
the causes which have led to them. My observatioils
are founded on Parliamentary official papers, and
on other works of authority ; and I hope they may
prove useful to the public, who have not, as a rule
time to study the intricate details of this difficult
subject. I have endeavoured to prove that tlle
tribes oil the frontier, and the people of Afghanistan,
have 110 real power of injuring our position in India ;
and turbulent as they may be, a policy of patience,
conciliation, and subsidies, is far more likely to attain
our object than incessant costly expeditions into
their mountains. Our influence over them is already
great, and is increasing year by year. By carefully
inaintaining the principles I have sketched out, we
shall gradually obtain their friendsl~ip,and also their
support, should other dangers ever threaten our
dominions.
We are the rulers of a great Empire in the
East, with its heavy duties and responsibilities, and
in devoting ourselves to the welfare of the millions
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under our sway, and in cleveloping the resources of
the country, we shall do far more for the happiness
of the people and the security of the Empire thau
by squandering our finances in constant expeditions
beyond its borders,

G E N E R A L SIR JOHN ADYE'S RECOLLECTIONS.
With Illustrations by the Author. Domy avo. 14s. net.

RECOLLECTIONS of a MILITARY LIFE.
B y General Sir JOHN ADYE, G.U.B.,R.A.
LATE

QOVERNOR OF

QIBIIALTAlt.

P R E S S OPINIONS.
Tho ACADEMY.-' These remiuiscences extend over more t l ~ a nfiixtyyea1.s ;
they comprise a record of manifold service, with a largo ex erie~lceof lnilitary
affairs in the East, and in several parts of our Empire.
%hat has struclr n o
most, however, in the work is the excellenco of Sir John Adye's judgmellt in tho
policy he advocates for our Indian Empire-his true perception of the cauees of the
outbrealr of 1857, the soundness of his conclusions as to the true modes of goverllment and administration in India11 affairs, of rulil~gthe dependent ~ n i l l i ~of~tile
~s
Great Peninsula. His reflections on this subject breathe the s&mespirit as those of
Wellington in his Indian Despatches.'
The TIMES.-' General Sir John Adye's " Recollections of his Militmy Life fl
cannot fail to be interesting, especially as throughout those"~ecollections"he subordinates himself to tho events he witnessed and describes. . . Sir Jolnl's viows on the
Central Asian question and those on the retention of Gibralt&r by this count~y
deserve perusal and consideration.'
PUNCH.--'These recollections me chiefly occupied with tho Crimeml War a~id
the Indian Mutiny, though the old sold~er11s; fiomething to say about the Afghan
War of 1878-9 and the Egyptian War of 1882 My Baronitc finds most interesting
the chapters about the Crimean Wai*, certain incidents and episodes of which are
narrated with soldierlike directness and simplicity.'
The D A I L Y 0EIRONICLXl.-'Sir John Adye has \mitten a very interesting
and hvely boolc, \v11icl1 will furnish oqually attractive rending for soldiers and civilians.'
The D A I L Y TELEGRAPH.-LMost valuable as well as most interesting
. . It wiU possess attractions far beyond professionnl ranlrs.'
The WORLD.-'Will
be found pleasanl and profitable reading not only by
thope of Sir John's contemporaries who remain, but also by the rising goneration df
soldiers, to whom the great events of forty years ago are already nncient histo~y!
~ hM
d O R N I N G POST.-' Sir John Adye's "Recollections " are well worth
roading. They are on the one hand varied by expressions of well-consideTed opinion
on important questions, and on the other hand brightened by a lively sense of humour
and a considerable sheaf of anecdotes.'
The B R O A D ARROW.-'We trust we have written and extrncted enough
to induce all our readers to obtain nnd ponder over this most readable andinstructive
boolt!
The GRAPHIC.-'The recollections of a soldier who, lilre Sir John Adye, has
not only
held important commands in warfare, but has also fonned part of the great
military ad~ninistrativemachine at home, could not fail to be of special interest.
The boolc is full of many shrewd observations and a number of good stories. The
sltetch of the Crimean War is in many respects the best of the several volmnes of
remil~isoencesof that cl~mpaignwhich have been published lately.'
The T I M E S O F INDIA.-' The " Recollections of a Military Life " which
General Sir John ABdye llaa published could hnrdly Inil lo be intorestin . They
are in fact
more than t h d , and the simplc but vigorous English in wfich they
are told and the modesty with which 11e refers to incidents which made his brother
officers
of him lend to the volume a singular charm.'
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The tales here told are written not t o glorify war, but to nourish patriotism.
They represent an eiTort to renew i n popnlar memory the great traditions of
the Imperial race t o whioli we belong.
Each slretch is complete in itself;
and though no formal quotation of autlloritics is given, get i l l t h e available
literatare on each event described has been laic1 under contribution. The
slrotches will be found to be historically accurate.
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From the TIMES.-' '' Deeds that Won the Empire" is admirably conceived a n d witten. Wolfe's striking feat of arm3 a t Quebec, Hawlce's ~plendid
victory in Quiberon Bay, Busaco, Albuera, the Nile, tile action of t h e S/lnnnos
and Chesapsalrs, with othcr memorable fights by sea and land, a r e vividly
described. Mr. Fitchctt has not sacrificed historical accuracy t o dra.2lmatlc
effect, a n d his words ring troe!
Froni t h B SPECTATOR.-'There have been plenty of attempts 1 o write t h e
story of England's battles on sea and land in s lai~guagewhich shall, while
plain and easily understood, give a true picture of the events depicted ; but
we have never met with olle which has proved 80 succeastul. The rnet,hod, a s
well as t h e tone and temper, of the book is enti~elysatisfactory. The writing
js full of life and colour, and dull must be he who can read its pages withuut
a thrill of pride ond pleasure.'
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